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DISSECTING THE HEART OF ORGAN ALLOCATION POLICY:
EVALUATING THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA’S
GRANT OF LIFE IN MURNAGHAN v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
JOCELYN COOPER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Mommy, I knew I was dying . . . .  I just didn’t want to tell you that I
was dying because I knew it would upset you.”1  Ten-year-old Sarah
Murnaghan was correct when she told her mother that she had been dy-
ing.2  For eighteen months, Sarah waited for a life-saving set of donated
lungs and without judicial intervention, Sarah probably would have lost
her battle with end-stage cystic fibrosis while waiting.3
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; M.A. 2010,
University of Maryland; B.A. 2008, Franklin & Marshall College.  I would like to
thank my husband, Derek Hines, and my family for their continued love and
support.  I would also like to thank the editors of the Villanova Law Review for their
hard work and advice.
1. See Chris Welch & Jason Carroll, Lung Transplant Gives Sarah Murnaghan
Chance to Live Her Dreams, CNN (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/08/26/health/sarah-murnaghan-update/ (questioning Sarah’s parents, Ja-
net and Francis Murnaghan, about their feelings on Sarah’s hospital discharge).
2. See Michael Martinez & Steve Almasy, Family of Girl Desperate for Transplant
Says She Can’t Wait for Policy to Change, CNN (June 3, 2013, 2:57 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/2013/06/02/health/pennsylvania-girl-lungs/index.html (stating that Sa-
rah’s parents felt that she had essentially been “left to die”).
3. See About Cystic Fibrosis, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., http://www.cff.org/
aboutcf/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (providing general information on nature and
symptoms of cystic fibrosis).  Cystic fibrosis is an inherited chronic disease that
affects the lungs and digestive system of about 30,000 children and adults in the
United States. See id. (noting 70,000 children and adults worldwide are affected).
A defective gene and its protein product cause the body to produce unusually
thick, sticky mucus that clogs the lungs and leads to life-threatening lung infec-
tions. See id. (explaining that most people are diagnosed before reaching two years
old).  The mucus also obstructs the pancreas and stops natural enzymes from help-
ing the body break down and absorb food. See id. (stating that there is no cure for
cystic fibrosis, but that there are aggressive treatments and therapies which can
improve quality of life).  People with cystic fibrosis can have a variety of symptoms
including: “very salty-tasting skin; persistent coughing, at times with phlegm; fre-
quent lung infections; wheezing or shortness of breath; poor growth [and] weight
gain in spite of a good appetite; and frequent greasy, bulky stools or difficulty in
bowel movements.” See id. (describing symptoms of cystic fibrosis).  The predicted
median age of survival for a person with cystic fibrosis is in the late thirties. See id.
(noting that there is no definitive method of predicting how long people with
cystic fibrosis will live, as various factors affect any person’s health).
(269)
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As of October 2013, Sarah was one of 76,910 tragic stories of people
waiting for a donated organ.4  For many of those 76,910 people, place-
ment on the waitlist is a death sentence.5  Unfortunately, demand in the
United States for donated organs far exceeds the supply and inherent in
the nature of scarcity is the terrible reality that not everyone can receive a
donated organ.6  While Sarah was lucky enough to receive her donated
lungs after filing a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
against the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), the courts cannot save all remaining 76,909 waiting list candi-
dates.7  Rather, judicial intervention into any individual transplant candi-
date’s case upsets the delicate balance of bioethical principles underlying
organ allocation policy and risks destroying the carefully crafted system
designed to benefit all 76,910 candidates.8
Certainly, Sarah Murnaghan’s parents are glad that Sarah now will be
able to go ride horses and play soccer like other healthy children.9  How-
ever, the Complaint in Murnaghan v. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services10 raises pervasive questions regarding the judiciary’s reach into ad-
ministrative agency rulemaking and the bioethical consequences of judi-
cial intervention into organ allocation policy.11  How much influence
4. See Data, OPTN: ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2014) [hereinafter OPTN Data] (providing data regarding current
number of active waiting list candidates).
5. See Organ Procurement Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.organdonor.gov/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (stating that
eighteen people die every day waiting for organs).
6. See Marc Siegel, The Troubling Shortage of Organ Donors in the U.S., FORBES
(Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcsiegel/2011/02/28/the-
troubling-shortage-of-organ-donors-in-the-u-s/ (acknowledging national organ
shortage).
7. See OPTN Data, supra note 4 (providing most current numbers for active
waiting list candidates).
8. For further discussion of the destructive impacts that arise from judicial
intervention into any individual transplant candidate’s case, see infra notes 177–90
and accompanying text.
9. See Rebekah Marcarelli, Sarah Murnaghan: 11 Year Old to Head Home After
Double Lung Transplant; Looks Forward to Horseback Riding and Soccer “I’m Not Going for
Easy, I’m Just Going for Possible”, HEADLINES & GLOBAL NEWS (Aug. 26, 2013 12:48
PM), http://www.hngn.com/articles/10932/20130826/sarah-murnaghan-11-year-
old-head-home-double-lung-transplant.htm (discussing Sarah’s future dreams after
having received double-lung transplant).
10. Complaint for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Per-
manent Injunctive Relief, Murnaghan v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No.
13-CV-03083, 2013 WL 2433840 (E.D. Pa., June 5, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint].
11. See Sydney Lupkin, Girl Prompts Small Change to Organ Transplant Policy,
ABC NEWS (June 11, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/girl-prompts-small-
change-organ-transplant-policy/story?id=19373685 (statement of Professor R. Alta
Charo, Warren P. Knowles Professor of Law and Bioethics at the University of Wis-
consin-Madison) (“It is unlikely that courts are the best place to make [organ allo-
cation] decisions . . . .  The reasons for giving priority to one category of patients
over another are usually due to a complicated combination of factors.”).
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should the judiciary have in an administrative agency’s formulation of pol-
icy, especially in the creation of organ allocation policy?12  Does the
Murnaghan decision violate primary ethical principles of organ allocation
policy as promulgated by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network (OPTN)?13
This Note argues that the Murnaghan decision demonstrates how judi-
cial interference with the organ allocation system destroys the balance of
bioethical principals upon which the system is formed.14  Furthermore,
this Note argues that Murnaghan violates Supreme Court precedent in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.15 because the
judiciary failed to defer to organ allocation policy formed by administra-
tive agencies and based upon expert scientific and medical knowledge.16
Part II of this Note examines the history of the OPTN under the Na-
tional Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), the mechanics of organ transplan-
tation, and the fundamental bioethical principles underlying organ
allocation policy.17  Part III discusses the relationship between the judici-
12. See Minutes of the OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee Meeting, Lung Al-
location Policy Review (June 10, 2013), available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.
gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf (ex-
pressing discontent with judicial intervention, which forced OPTN/UNOS com-
mittee to reevaluate its policy regarding organ allocation to pre-adolescent
candidates).
13. For a further discussion of the bioethical impacts of judicial intervention
in cases of individual transplant candidates, see infra notes 177–90 and accompany-
ing text.
14. For a discussion of the ethical principles guiding organ allocation policy,
see infra notes 58–90 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the impact of the
Murnaghan decision on those principles, see infra notes 177–200 and accompany-
ing text.
15. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16. For a discussion of judicial authority and deference to administrative
agency decisions, see infra notes 91–116 and accompanying text.
17. See National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 274a–g
(2006) (establishing OPTN).
The Secretary shall by contract provide for the establishment and opera-
tion of an Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network . . . .
(b) Functions
(1) The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network shall
carry out the functions described in paragraph (2) and shall—
(A) be a private nonprofit entity that has an expertise in organ pro-
curement and transplantation, and
(B) have a board of directors—
(i) that includes representatives of organ procurement organiza-
tions . . . transplant centers, voluntary health associations, and the
general public; and
(ii) that shall establish an executive committee and other
committees . . . .
(2) The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network shall—
(A) establish in one location or through regional centers—
(i) a national list of individuals who need organs, and
(ii) a national system, through the use of computers and in accor-
dance with established medical criteria, to match organs and individ-
3
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ary and administrative agencies and the general concept of judicial defer-
ence to administrative agency rulemaking and expertise in Chevron.18  Part
IV sets forth the facts leading up to Murnaghan and the justification be-
hind the court’s decision to direct the OPTN to cease enforcement of Pol-
icy 3.7 (Under 12 Rule).19  Part V critically analyzes the court’s
intervention into administrative agency action and the bioethical conse-
quences of that intervention.20  Part VI suggests several approaches to
solve excessive judicial intervention into organ allocation policy.21
uals included in the list, especially individuals whose immune system
makes it difficult for them to receive organs,
(B) establish membership criteria and medical criteria for allocating
organs and provide to members of the public an opportunity to com-
ment with respect to such criteria, . . .
(D) assist organ procurement organizations in the nationwide distri-
bution of organs equitably among transplant patients, . . .
(G) coordinate, as appropriate, the transportation of organs from
organ procurement organizations to transplant centers, . . .
(K) work actively to increase the supply of donated organs, . . .
(M) recognize the differences in health and in organ transplantation
issues between children and adults throughout the system and adopt
criteria, polices, and procedures that address the unique health care
needs of children,
(N) carry out studies and demonstration projects for the purpose of
improving procedures for organ donation procurement and alloca-
tion, including but not limited to projects to examine and attempt to
increase transplantation among populations with special needs, in-
cluding children and individuals who are members of racial or eth-
nic minority groups, and among populations with limited access to
transportation . . . .
Id. § 274(a)–(b) (setting forth functions of OPTN and role of HHS).
18. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984) (determining that federal judges must defer to administrative agency
policy decision).
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision,
fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy,
rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by
Congress, the challenge must fail.  In such a case, federal judges—who
have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices
made by those who do.
Id. (recognizing that statutory interpretation should not be attempted by judges
but rather by administrative agencies).
19. See Letter from John Roberts, President, OPTN Bd. of Dirs., to Kathleen
Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (May 30, 2013), available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_Comm_mtng_
materials_06-10-13.pdf (discussing OPTN’s Policy 3.7 (Under 12 Rule), which gov-
erns lung allocation policy for pediatric candidates and severely limited Sarah’s
ability to receive donated lungs).
20. For further discussion of the interplay between Chevron and key bioethical
principles of organ allocation in Murnaghan, see infra notes 156–90 and accompa-
nying text.
21. For a further discussion of the approaches, which might be used to limit
excessive judicial intervention in organ allocation policy, see infra notes 191–217
and accompanying text.
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II. THE ANATOMY OF ORGAN ALLOCATION POLICY
To understand the difficulties facing Sarah Murnaghan and the
OPTN in navigating organ allocation policy, it is critical to understand the
substantial background information concerning organ transplantation.22
As the OPTN developed under NOTA, organ transplantation technology
expanded the scope of transplant candidates and the need for donated
organs.23  Thus, it became necessary to develop an organ allocation system
that balanced the severity of individual cases with overall fairness to all the
candidates on the waiting list.24  The bioethical principles of utility, dis-
tributive justice, and autonomy help policymakers decide how to distribute
resources such as organs where demand is high and the supply is scarce.25
A. History and Mechanics of NOTA and the OPTN
Modern advances in technology and medicine continue to expand
the number of patients able to benefit from organ transplantation, yet the
supply of organs is unable to meet the increasing demand.26  In October
2013, there were 76,910 active waiting list candidates for organ transplants
and only 5,694 organ donors.27  Given the scarcity of donated organs, the
OPTN, under the authority of NOTA, must continually strive to promul-
gate effective organ allocation policies and to maintain an efficient organ
transplantation network.28  This section will provide a background on the
implementation of NOTA and the establishment of the OPTN.29  This sec-
tion then examines the mechanics of organ allocation and, more specifi-
22. For a discussion of the court’s decision in Murnaghan, see infra notes
117–55 and accompanying text.
23. See Jed Adam Gross, Note, E Pluribus UNOS: The National Organ Transplant
Act and Its Postoperative Complications, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 145, 149
(2008) (“[A]s more patients were able to benefit from transplant surgery, the avail-
able supply of organs did not keep up with the demand . . . .”).
24. For a further discussion of the history of NOTA, see infra notes 31–36 and
accompanying text.  For a further discussion of the text of NOTA, see supra note
17.
25. For a discussion of utility, see infra notes 62–72 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of distributive justice principles, see infra notes 73–84 and accom-
panying text.
26. See Gross, supra note 23, at 147 (claiming that there is persistent scarcity of
donated organs).
27. See OPTN Data, supra note 4 (showing that number of organ donors,
5,694, only includes donations from January 2013 to May 2013).
28. See About OPTN: Program Goals, OPTN: ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANS-
PLANTATION NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://optn.trans-
plant.hrsa.gov/optn/programgoals.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (stating OPTN’s
hopes to achieve dramatic increases in supply of transplantable organ and number
of deceased donors).
29. For a discussion of the historical and legislative background of NOTA and
the OPTN, see infra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
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cally, how lungs are allocated amongst adults and children under the age
of twelve.30
1. The History of NOTA and the OPTN
The first successful organ transplant in 1954 propelled the medical
field into a new area of life-saving technology but at the same time, in-
creased the need for legislation governing growing health and social pol-
icy concerns.31  In 1984, Congress enacted NOTA to facilitate the process
of matching donor organs with patients needing transplants.32  NOTA ar-
ticulated a consistent, national policy for allocating organs, established the
30. For a discussion of the organ donation process, see infra notes 37–53 and
accompanying text.
31. See Organ Transplant History, N.Y. ORGAN DONOR NETWORK, http://www.
donatelifeny.org/all-about-transplantation/organ-transplant-history/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2014) (noting that first successful living-related kidney transplant, led by
Dr. Joseph Murray and Dr. David Hume at Brigham Boston, was between identical
twins and occurred on December 23, 1954); see also Gross, supra note 23, at 153–78
(examining history of organ transplantation prior to and after NOTA).  Organ
transplantation became a viable option in the 1950s. See id. at 153 (noting that
1950s organ transplantation technology was primitive and transplantation could be
performed only between identical twins).  At that time, there was no existing for-
mal organ allocation system. See id. (explaining that because of newness and ineffi-
ciency of organ transplant technology there was no need for any formal organ
donation system).  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the development of
cyclosporine therapy, which was highly effective in preventing the rejection of
donated organs, changed the nature of organ transplantation by increasing trans-
plant survival rates. See id. at 170–71 (describing major technological advances in
organ transplantation medicine).  The development of cyclosporine therapy high-
lighted several “difficult and unusual social conditions,” including “dire scarcity
amid material abundance . . . , a profound dependence on strangers . . . , a lack of
reliable legal rules . . . , and stubborn, seemingly innate inequalities” in the distri-
bution of organs. See id. at 172–73 (explaining need for structured organ donation
system).  In July and October of 1983, congressional hearings similarly emphasized
several bioethical concerns regarding the allocation of organs after the introduc-
tion of cyclosporine. See id. at 181 (recounting beginning stages of NOTA in Con-
gress).  Specifically, the introduction of cyclosporine was likely to limit the persons
who would benefit from organ transplantation because of the lack of money and
donor organs. See id. at 182 (describing major concern for legislature in conceiv-
ing NOTA).
32. See Gross, supra note 23, at 149 (noting that accounts differ about legisla-
tive concerns or desires that prompted NOTA).  Frank Sloan, an economist who
has written extensively about health policy, suggested that Congress desired to es-
tablish a formalized organ donation system in order to expand the “relatively low
rate of organ procurement” and to expand the national computerized matching
system to include not just kidneys, but also livers and hearts. See id. (arguing that
problems were on supply side of organ allocation, rather than demand side).  Dr.
Arthur Caplan, bioethicist at New York University’s Langone Medical Center, states
that Congress was concerned that wealthy international patients were travelling to
the U.S. in order to receive organs that should have been directed to Americans
first. See id. (“[P]roblems were on the demand side of organ allocation, rather
than supply side.”).  Jeffrey Prottas, a political scientist specializing in health policy,
emphasized the role of organized professional interests rather than public policy
concerns and stated that NOTA was a “response to lobbying by medical practition-
ers seeking an expansion of reimbursement for transplant therapy following the
6
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OPTN to maintain the organ donation system, and increased the number
of organs available for transplant.33
The OPTN is composed of transplant centers and organ procurement
organizations (OPOs) across the country linked together by the OPTN’s
computer network, which sends and receives donor information.34  To
manage the network of OPOs, the OPTN facilitates the organ matching
and placement process through the use of a centralized computer system,
develops policies and procedures for organ procurement based on medi-
cal expertise and public consensus, harvests and transports donated or-
gans, and collects national data about organ donation and
transplantation.35  In 1999, the Secretary of the HHS promulgated the Fi-
nal Rule under NOTA, which supplements the statute by requiring that
introduction of . . . cyclosporine.” See id. (theorizing that economic concerns were
important in NOTA’s development).
33. See Gail L. Daubert, Politics, Policies, and Problems with Organ Transplanta-
tion: Government Regulation Needed to Ration Organs Equitably, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 459,
463 (1998) (providing background on NOTA and discussing current problems
with OPTN organ allocation system).  Additionally, NOTA established the OPTN
and directed the Secretary of HHS to contract with a private, non-profit organiza-
tion to manage the OPTN. See id. (looking at Congress’s intent behind deciding to
contract with private entity).  Congress decided to contract with a private entity
because private entities had taken the “initiative in developing the original organ
transplantation networks.” See id. (“Congress feared that government bureaucra-
cies would not keep pace with the rapidly changing medical field, and government
intervention would impede the adoption of new policies.”); see also About OPTN:
History, OPTN: ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/history.asp (Feb.
3, 2014) (noting that United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) was awarded
initial OPTN contract on September 30, 1986 and has continued to operate OPTN
for more than sixteen years and four successive contract renewals).
34. See Organ Procurement Organizations, supra note 5 (delineating OPO respon-
sibilities and explaining that OPOs are federally regulated).  OPOs are principally
responsible for obtaining donor organs. See id. (detailing OPO methods for in-
creasing organ donation including community outreach, advertising campaigns,
and school and worksite programs); see also About OPOs, ASS’N OF ORGAN PROCURE-
MENT ORGS., http://www.aopo.org/about-opo (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (re-
vealing OPO structure and goals).  There are fifty-eight federally-designated OPOs
throughout the United States and its territories. See About OPOs, supra (“OPOs
utilize cutting edge technology to facilitate medical advancements that place hope
within reach for tens of thousands of Americans waiting for a life-saving organ
transplant.”).  OPOs are “generally structured to include clinical services, hospital
development, donor family services, and public education.” Id. (reporting that
each OPO is tailored to serve its local community).
35. See About OPTN: Profile, OPTN: ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION
NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.
gov/optn/profile.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (listing OPTN’s responsibilities).
These responsibilities include: collecting and managing organ transplantation sta-
tistics for the government, the public, students, and researchers to use for future
improvements in organ allocation and transplantation and “developing . . . and
maintaining a secure web-based computer system,” which matches organ donors
and available organs nationally. See id. (noting that in handling all of its responsi-
bilities, OPTN strives to be efficient and effective).
7
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the OPTN develop policies that provide organs to those with the greatest
medical urgency through an “equitable” allocation system.36
2. The Mechanics of Organ Allocation
Generally, when any donor organ becomes available, the OPO enters
information about the donor organ into the OPTN’s computerized match
system in order to identify a list of potential recipients needing that type of
organ.37  The list of candidates identified by the OPTN’s matching system
is then ranked according to objective criteria.38  While each organ has its
36. See 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(b)(2) (2007) (emphasizing that organ allocation
must be decided by medical urgency).  Before the Final Rule, organs in the United
States were distributed on a regional basis to patients based upon their need. See
Dulcinea A. Grantham, Transforming Transplantation: The Effect of the Health and
Human Services Final Rule on the Organ Allocation System, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 751, 752
(2001) (discussing background and development of the Final Rule).  This system
was greatly criticized by health professionals because it often resulted in inequita-
ble distribution based on location and was medically ineffective. See id. at 770
(showing that prior to Final Rule, organ distribution was localized in smaller geo-
graphic regions rather than favoring one national, need-based system).  The Final
Rule transformed the organ allocation from a “local first” system to a national
system, which achieved organ distribution in “regions broad enough to assure that
those patients with greatest medical urgency are provided for.” See id. at 766 (im-
posing additional requirement that Secretary of HHS has ultimate power to deter-
mine way in which organs are distributed).  The ultimate goal of the Final Rule was
to ensure an equitable nationwide system for donated organs. See id. at 757 (show-
ing legislative intent behind NOTA).  The Final Rule was criticized for allocating
organs to patients with low potential survival rates, for forcing small OPOs out of
business, and for discouraging organ donations. See id. at 774–77 (discussing dis-
advantages of having one nationwide equitable donation system); see also Letter
from John Roberts to Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 19 (describing process used to
develop OPTN allocation policy).  An OPTN committee with special knowledge of
the particular organ develops all allocation policy for that organ. See id. (asserting
that OPTN committees formulate policy based on objective medical evidence and
current clinical practice).  The specialized committee develops a proposal that is
forwarded to the public in order to allow comments by any interested parties or
organizations. See id. (explaining that all policy is open to public comment and
committee will further refine proposal based on public comment before present-
ing it to OPTN/UNOS Board of Directors for review and vote).  Approved policies
are made available to the Department of Health and Human Services and are sub-
ject to the Secretary’s discretion for enforcement or reconsideration, under the
provisions of the Final Rule. See id. (highlighting distinction between OPTN’s role
in creating policy based on extensive medical knowledge and Secretary’s govern-
ance role in approving policies created by OPTN).
37. See About Transplantation: Donor Matching System, OPTN: ORGAN PROCURE-
MENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/about/transplantation (last visited Feb. 9, 2014)
(detailing process by which donor organs are matched with waiting list
candidates).
38. See id. (“Ethnicity, gender, religion, and financial status are not part of the
computer matching system.”).
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own specific criteria for organ matching, all organs share certain alloca-
tion policy commonalities.39
For lung transplant candidates, all candidates ages twelve and older
are given an individualized lung allocation score (LAS) to prioritize them
for matching organ offers.40  Factors determining a potential recipient’s
LAS and priority on the waitlist include: the probability of surviving the
next year while remaining on the waitlist, the medical urgency of the can-
didate, the probability of surviving the first year after the transplant, the
probability of surviving long term after the transplant and the raw alloca-
tion score.41  Candidates with the highest LAS are offered donated organs
39. See Letter from John Roberts to Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 19 (summa-
rizing shared commonalities of organ matching policy for all organs).  The shared
policy criteria that OPTN considers when matching donated organ with potential
recipients include:
[A] local/zonal/national sequence of organ offers, to minimize organ
preservation time and maximize the chance of a successful transplant[;]
priority in matching for identical blood type matching between donor
and candidate, then for compatible but not identical blood types[;] use
of individual waiting time as an ultimate tiebreaker among two candidates
who have otherwise equal priority[;] discretion for the individual trans-
plant center to apply individual acceptance criteria for offers for individ-
ual candidates, including donor size and age range.
Id. (listing various factors taken into account when matching donors with organs).
40. See A Guide to Calculating the Lung Allocation Score, UNITED NETWORK OF
ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/docs/lung_allocation_score.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2014) (discussing various factors which contribute to calculating poten-
tial recipient’s LAS and providing hypothetical computation of LAS).  Factors
determining a potential recipient’s LAS and priority on the waitlist include: the
waiting list survival probability during the next year, the waitlist urgency measure,
the post-transplant survival probability during the first post-transplant year, the
post-transplant long-term survival measure, and the raw allocation score. See id.
(noting complexity and highly technical nature of calculating LAS).  “The specific
emphasis in developing the LAS score for adolescents and adults was to base organ
allocation on a balanced, ‘net-benefit’ concept.”  Letter from John Roberts to
Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 19.  There are not enough donated organs currently
available to meet all needs. See id. (emphasizing importance of designing one effi-
cient organ allocation system).  Organ allocation based purely on distributive jus-
tice principles (i.e., preferentially offering organs to those with the highest need)
would result in lower overall survival rates because candidates may be so debili-
tated that post-transplantation survival would be unlikely. See id. (presenting pat-
tern of distribution relying on distributive justice).  Conversely, offering organs
preferentially to those with the greatest chances of post-transplantation survival,
“would lead to higher waitlist mortality among urgent candidates who could be
helped.” See id. (presenting distribution relying on utility).  The LAS score bal-
ances these conflicting priorities. See id. (taking into account both utility and dis-
tributive justice).
41. See A Guide to Calculating the Lung Allocation Score, supra note 40 (discussing
various factors contributing to calculating potential recipient’s LAS and priority of
waitlist).
9
Cooper: Dissecting the Heart of Organ Allocation Policy: Evaluating the E
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-2\VLR202.txt unknown Seq: 10 30-APR-14 12:01
278 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 269
first.42  The LAS formula is only used for adolescent and adult
candidates.43
Instead of an LAS, children under the age of twelve needing lung
transplants are given either a Priority 1, the highest medical urgency sta-
tus, or a Priority 2 medical urgency status for ranking purposes.44  Priority
1 candidates either have respiratory failure or pulmonary hypertension, or
have been approved as an exception case by the OPTN Lung Review
Board.45  Waitlist placement among Priority 1 candidates is determined by
the amount of time a candidate has been on the waitlist with the candi-
dates who have been on the waitlist the longest being placed at the top.46
Priority 1 candidates are offered donated organs from all donors younger
than twelve within a thousand-mile radius before the donated organs are
offered to any candidates older than twelve in the same area.47  Pediatric
candidates can receive lungs from adolescent donors but only if transplant
programs decline them for all adolescent candidates between the age of
twelve and seventeen within the same allocation area.48  Pediatric candi-
dates can also receive lungs from adult donors but only if transplant pro-
grams decline them after all adolescent and adult candidates within the
42. See id. (illustrating that ranking transplant candidates relies on several
complex calculations which take into account various elements).
43. See Letter from John Roberts to Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 19 (describ-
ing lung allocation policy for candidates under twelve years old).  Dr. John Roberts
states that:
The LAS formula is used for adolescent and adult candidates.  Its applica-
bility among pre-adolescents is unknown.  There are very few of these
patients, and the diagnosis and progression of lung diseases may be dif-
ferent in this population. . . .  For this reason, the [Thoracic Organ Trans-
plantation Committee] felt that extrapolating the LAS below age 12 was
inappropriate and, because of the small numbers, also concluded that
waiting time for this population should remain the method of prioritizing
patients in this group.  Because there was no way to appropriately priori-
tize 0–11 year old patients with the list of patients ordered by LAS, it was
decided to provide 0–11 candidates first priority for organs best suited for
them—those from 0–11 year old donors.
Id. (explaining why it is not appropriate for children under twelve and adults to be
prioritized by similar standards).
44. See Policy 3.7.6.2, Allocation of Thoracic Organs, Candidates Age 0–11, OPTN:
ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. (Feb. 1, 2013), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocu-
ments/OPTN_Exec_Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf [hereinafter Policy
3.7.6.2] (defining criteria for candidates to be placed in either Priority 1 status or
Priority 2 status); see also Letter from John Roberts to Kathleen Sebelius, supra note
19 (illustrating unlikelihood that children will receive acceptable adult organs).
45. See Policy 3.7.6.2, supra note 44 (explaining how Priority 1 candidates are
categorized).
46. See Letter from John Roberts to Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 19 (explain-
ing how Priority 1 candidates are ranked).
47. See id. (noting children receive child-donated organs first).
48. See id. (stating children receive adolescent organs after adolescents de-
cline them).
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same allocation area have turned them down.49  Any transplant candidate
who does not meet the criteria to be listed as a Priority 1 candidate is
automatically listed as a Priority 2 candidate.50
For all donated organs including lungs, after receiving a list of poten-
tial recipients, the OPO contacts the transplant surgeon caring for the top-
ranked patient and depending on various factors, the transplant surgeon
determines if the organ is suitable for the patient.51  Doctors determine
whether organs are medically suitable by looking to the medical health
history of the donor, the current health of the recipient, and the condi-
tion of the donated organ.52  If the organ is suitable, the OPO arranges
transportation and schedules the transplant surgery.53  Because donated
organs are in such high demand, organ allocation is guided by bioethical
principles.54
B. Ethical Principles Governing Equitable Organ Allocation
Organ allocation presents a unique and tragic bioethical dilemma.55
While available organs surround us in abundance, eighteen people still
die every day on the waitlist.56  Because our donation system relies on do-
nor altruism, it is an impossible task for the OPTN to reconcile the scarce
supply of donated organs with the vast demand.57  Thus, the OPTN is
compelled to make life and death decisions about who should receive a
donated organ and who will have to remain on the waitlist.58
49. See id. (stating children receive adult lungs only after all adolescent and
adult candidates decline them).
50. See id. (stating children are given adult organs after adults and adolescents
decline them).
51. See About Transplantation: Donor Matching System, supra note 37 (highlight-
ing that donated organs cannot always be used).
52. See id. (explaining how doctors determine whether organs are medically
suitable for donation).
53. See id. (stating that recovered organs are stored in cold organ preservation
solution and transported from donors to recipient hospitals).  For heart and lung
recipients, it is best to transplant the organ within six hours of organ recovery. See
id. (illustrating time-sensitive nature of organ transplantation).
54. For a discussion of utilitarianism in OPTN organ allocation policies, see
supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of distributive justice
in OPTN organ allocation policies, see supra notes 73–84 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of autonomy in OPTN organ allocation policies, see supra notes
85–90 and accompanying text.
55. See Gross, supra note 23, at 172 (explaining that one “difficult and unu-
sual” condition of organ allocation is “dire scarcity amid material abundance”).
56. See Statistics, DONATE LIFE AM., http://donatelife.net/understanding-do-
nation/statistics/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (providing organ donation statistics).
57. See OPTN Data, supra note 4 (illustrating vast difference in number be-
tween organ transplants and people waiting for organs).
58. See Memorandum from the OPTN/UNOS Ethics Comm. to the OPTN/
UNOS Exec. Comm. (June 10, 2013), http://www.optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/Con-
tentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf [hereinafter
OPTN/UNOS Memorandum] (noting significant role that OPTN decisions play in
lives of thousands of transplant candidates).
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For the purposes of determining who is given a donated organ, the
OPTN justifies their policies based on principles of utility, distributive jus-
tice, and autonomy.59  It is important to understand the fundamental role
these bioethical principles play in OPTN organ allocation policy in order
to recognize the destructive bioethical impacts that the Murnaghan deci-
sion and the special review of Sarah’s case caused to the entire organ allo-
cation system.60  This part discusses utility, distributive justice, and
autonomy in the context of organ allocation.61
1. Utility
The principle of utility holds an action to be ethically right if it pro-
duces the greatest aggregate good and minimizes the harms for the great-
est amount of people.62  The goal of utilitarianism is to maximize the
aggregate happiness of the whole society by distributing benefits to those
who are going to maximize the benefit.63  Utility disregards the process by
which a resource is maximized and rather, strives to reach the best possi-
ble outcome in the distribution of a resource.64  Developing policy that
maximizes benefits requires that lawmakers compare the allocation meth-
ods “in some manner so that at least a rough estimate can be made deter-
mining which allocation produces the greatest good.”65
Thus, as applied to organ allocation, the principle of utility requires
that policymakers create organ allocation policy that maximizes the “best
59. See id. (“The transparent balancing of utility and [distributive] justice
combined with a predictable and stable application of allocation policy is critical to
the fairness of the national system.”).
60. For a further discussion of the bioethical consequences resulting from
special review of any individual transplant candidate’s case, see infra notes 177–90
and accompanying text.
61. For a discussion of utilitarianism in OPTN organ allocation policies, see
infra notes 62–72 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of distributive justice in
OPTN organ allocation policies, see infra notes 73–84 and accompanying text.  For
a discussion of autonomy in OPTN organ allocation policies, see infra notes 85–90
and accompanying text.
62. See OPTN/UNOS ETHICS COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE ALLOCATION OF HUMAN ORGANS
(2010), available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index
=10 [hereinafter OPTN/UNOS, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES] (discussing ethical principles
to be considered in organ allocation); see also The Principle of Beneficence in Applied
Ethics, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Oct. 3, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
principle-beneficence/ [hereinafter Principle of Beneficence] (discussing intersection
between utility and beneficence).  Beneficence is an ethical principle that requires
that a person do good and avoid doing harm. See Principle of Beneficence, supra (not-
ing that both utility and beneficence attempt to maximize benefits and minimize
burdens).
63. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 6
(1987) (noting that there are several, varying definitions of “happiness”).
64. See Principle of Beneficence, supra note 62 (explaining that utility determines
moral righteousness of action by looking at outcome, not process).
65. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 63, at 6 (stating that utility is essential for
thorough review of any allocation policy and requires system wide measurement).
12
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use” of donated organs while minimizing possible negative consequences
of transplantation.66  Organ allocation policy, which makes the most effi-
cient and the “best” use of donated organs maximizes, “the saving of life,
the relief of suffering and debility, the removal of psychological impair-
ment, and the promotion of well-being.”67  Conversely, the harms that a
utilitarian-based organ allocation policy attempts to minimize are patient
post-transplantation mortality and mortality resulting from organ rejection
and medicinal complications.68  Because of the scarce supply of donated
organs in the face of ever-growing demand, utility remains an essential
component of organ allocation policy, and the OPTN continues to rely on
utility to efficiently manage its organ allocation system.69
However, too much emphasis on utility and maximizing the best use
of organs in allocation policy may result in persistent inequities in the dis-
tribution of organs.70  For instance, a system based solely on utility would
seek, without regard to the pattern of distribution, to save the lives of as
many organ transplant candidates as possible by taking into account fac-
tors including post-transplantation survival rates, long-term survival rates,
and even an individual’s social worth.71  The result would be that certain
groups, like the elderly, would have little chance at meeting these criteria
and thus, would always be passed over for candidates who have a greater
chance at maximizing the best use of donated organs.72
2. Distributive Justice
Unlike utility, distributive justice focuses solely on the process by
which a resource is distributed among potential beneficiaries and requires
66. See OPTN/UNOS, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 62 (noting that organ
procurement and transplantation is undertaken to benefit groups of critically ill
patients).
67. See id. (providing examples of utilitarian goals underlying organ alloca-
tion policies).
68. See id. (stating that utility takes into account all possible goods and harms
that could be envisioned).
69. See OPTN/UNOS Memorandum, supra note 58 (noting that allocating in
manner that maximizes best use of organ is in accordance with requirements of
NOTA and Final Rule, and defining “best” in accordance with utility as that which
maximizes greatest amount of good for greatest amount of people).
70. See F. Daniel Davis, The Ethics of Organ Allocation: Policy Questions Concerning
Geography, Age, and Net Benefit, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2007), http://
bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/background/ethics_of_organ_allocation.html
(examining organ allocation policy in light of utility and distributive justice).  Utili-
tarians would be inclined to discriminate against the elderly in allocating organs
since transplantations in senior citizens would generally result in low survival rates.
See generally ROBERT M. VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICS (2000) (explaining that
utility ignores patterns of distribution of goods being allocated).
71. See VEATCH, supra note 70, at 293–94 (discussing problems with a purely
utilitarian organ allocation system).
72. See id. (stating that utilitarians seek efficiency in distribution of donated
organs not fairness).
13
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that equal persons be given equal access to the resource.73  Distributive
justice attempts to create an allocation policy based on fair and equitable
distribution of benefits and requires that people in similar situations be
treated equally.74  The principle of distributive justice suggests that “soci-
ety has a duty to the individual in serious need and that all individuals
have duties to others in serious need.”75  In decisions regarding the alloca-
tion of resources, distributive justice does not evaluate the quality or social
value of a candidate, but requires that the benefits and burdens should be
distributed in an equitable manner.76
In the context of organ allocation, distributive justice requires that all
people in need of organs should have a fair opportunity to receive them
and that no potential transplant candidate is denied organs because of
personal, economic, or social qualities.77  Policies grounded in distributive
justice and fairness take into account a variety of factors including medical
urgency, time spent on the waitlist, number of past transplants, and age of
the candidate.78  In response to NOTA’s requirement that donated organs
73. See OPTN/UNOS Memorandum, supra note 58 (“[M]orally relevant dif-
ferences may justify unequal distribution of goods[ ].”); see also Friedrich Breyer,
Health Care Rationing and Distributive Justice, 0 RATIONALITY MARKETS & MORALS 395,
401 (2009), http://www.rmm-journal.de/downloads/028_breyer.pdf (presenting
several different meanings of “equal” in context of resource allocation).
74. See Principle of Distributive Justice, ASCENSION HEALTH, http://www.ascen-
sionhealth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80:principle-of-
distributive-justice&Itemid=171 (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (“[D]istributive justice
is . . . closely linked to the concepts of human dignity, the common good, and
human rights.”).
75. See id. (emphasizing basic human right to health care).
76. See id. (noting society’s duty to individuals in serious need of any resource
is not lessened because of beneficiary’s societal or financial status, or nature of
illness).  Well-known medical ethicist Georg Marckmann has suggested a set of
criteria relevant to designing a just allocation policy. See Breyer, supra note 73, at
400 (discussing interchange between rationing scarce health care resources and
distributive justice).  Marckmann states that the criteria includes: “the trans-
parency of the [allocation] process,” “the implementation by a democratically le-
gitimized institution,” the possibility for important groups of interested parties to
participate, consistency, and opportunities for appeal of decisions. See id. (illustrat-
ing that distributive justice focuses not on outcome but on pattern of distribution
of goods).
77. See OPTN/UNOS Memorandum, supra note 58 (noting that when consid-
ering individuals, distributive justice requires that “likes be treated alike” and sug-
gesting that “morally relevant differences may justify unequal distribution of
goods”).  Distributive justice requires that two patients who are equal in all “mor-
ally relevant” considerations should have the same chance of getting a donated
organ. See id. (“[I]f one person has an objectively higher probability of dying with-
out an organ than another person, that difference would be considered morally
relevant [to allocation] and would justify giving the organ to first person.”).
78. See OPTN/UNOS, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 62 (presenting these
factors as ones which might be included in allocation policy because they seem
necessary to treat potential recipients fairly and to give everyone fair chances of
getting donated organs).  Allocation schemes based on distributive justice may give
consideration to the most medically urgent patients, who are unlikely to have long-
term post-transplantation survival rates even if it is predictable that other patients
14
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be distributed equitably, the OPTN balances all of these distributive justice
factors when they rank transplant candidates.79
Too much emphasis on distributive justice may generate inefficien-
cies and waste donated organs for which the supply is limited and the
demand is always growing.80  For instance, an organ allocation system de-
signed purely with distributive justice in mind would hold as their princi-
pal goal that all people should have an equal opportunity to be as well-off
and healthy as all other people.81  The implications of such a system would
result in placing the sickest people at the top of the organ transplantation
waiting list.82  However, the people with the greatest need for donated
organs may also have higher post-transplantation mortality rates.83  While
a system based solely on distributive justice would be fair in that it would
allow for equal access to donated organs, arguably the number of people
ultimately saved through organ transplantation would be fewer than a sys-
tem balanced with utility.84
3. Autonomy
The principle of autonomy holds that actions are ethically right inso-
far as those actions respect an individual’s exercise of self-determination
and freedom to make decisions affecting one’s own person.85  Autonomy
preserves an individual’s free will and right “to live one’s life according to
reasons and motives that are taken as one’s own and not the product of
manipulative or distorting external forces.”86  The central principle of au-
who are not as sick may have better post-transplantation survival rates. See id. (em-
phasizing that distributive justice is concerned with fairness and equity).
79. See id. (pointing out that UNOS has continued to express concern for
distributive justice in organ allocation); see also A Guide to Calculating Lung Alloca-
tion Score, supra note 40 (illustrating balancing of distributive justice factors and
utility factors for purposes of ranking transplant candidates).
80. See Davis, supra note 70 (reflecting on attempt to balance utility and dis-
tributive justice in organ allocation policy).  Because utility and distributive justice
often conflict, an efficient, utilitarian system focused on maximizing a benefit will
probably not be the most equitable or the most fair. See VEATCH, supra note 70, at
295 (showing that conversely, pure distributive justice systems will probably be
inefficient).
81. See VEATCH, supra note 70, at 295 (demonstrating goals and results of dis-
tributive justice allocation system).
82. See id. (explaining how distributive justice organ allocation system would
operate to distribute organs).
83. See id. (noting negative results of organ allocation system based solely on
distributive justice).
84. See id. (stating need for organ allocation system balancing utility and dis-
tributive justice).
85. See OPTN/UNOS, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 62 (discussing impor-
tance of autonomy in creating organ allocation policy).
86. See Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Aug. 11,
2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/ (“[T]o be autono-
mous is to be one’s own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, condi-
tions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are
part of . . . one’s authentic self.”).
15
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tonomy is that a person has complete control to make decisions regarding
their own person as long as those decisions do not impose upon the rights
of others.87
When autonomy conflicts with utility and distributive justice in the
creation of organ allocation policy, the OPTN often prioritizes utility and
distributive justice over autonomy.88  However, the principle of autonomy
deserves consideration in creating organ allocation policies as it preserves
an individual’s free will and right to make decisions about organ trans-
plantation.89  Factors relevant to the creation of organ allocation policies
protecting autonomy include: “1) the right to refuse an organ; 2) [the
right of] free exchanges among autonomous individuals; 3) allocation by
directed donation; and 4) transparency of processes and allocation rules
to enable stakeholders to make an informed decision.”90
III. PRESCRIBING LIMITS TO THE JUDICIARY’S REACH INTO ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
This section explores the parameters of judicial authority in the scope
of administrative agency rulemaking and expertise.91  Because the
Murnaghan decision highlights the relationship between the judiciary and
an administrative agency, especially in light of bioethical considerations, it
is essential to understand the respective authorities of the judiciary and
administrative agencies.92  The relationship between the judiciary and an
administrative agency is largely determined by fundamental separation of
powers principles and Supreme Court precedent on judicial deference to
administrative agency rulemaking expertise in Chevron.93
87. See OPTN/UNOS, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 62 (“Persons and their
actions are never ‘fully’ autonomous, but nevertheless it is possible to recognize
certain individuals and their decisions as more or less substantially autonomous.”).
88. See id. (noting that “sometimes autonomy must give way,” “when it con-
flicts with other ethical principles” in determining equitable distributions of
organs).
89. See id. (“If one of the characteristics of actions or practices that tend to
make them right is that they respect autonomy, then it is possible that certain
policies could be morally right, at least prima facie, even if they do not maximize
utility and do not promote equitable distributions.”).
90. Id. (listing factors to consider when forming organ allocation policy
grounded in autonomy).
91. For a further discussion of the relationship between the judiciary and ad-
ministrative agencies, see infra notes 92–116 and accompanying text.
92. See Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Prelimi-
nary Injunction, Murnaghan v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 13-CV-
03083, 2013 WL 3363500 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013) [hereinafter Emergency Motion]
(emphasizing that plaintiff filed suit against HHS, as administrative agency and
that OPTN/UNOS are private organizations under HHS authority).
93. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984) (questioning judiciary’s ability to interpret Clean Air Act provisions).
For a discussion of the role of administrative agencies in a tripartite government
system, see infra notes 94–103 and accompanying text.
16
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A. Administrative Agencies and the Judiciary: Separation of Powers
An administrative agency is a government authority with quasi-judicial
power that promulgates, enforces, and interprets regulations for recently
passed statutes.94  Unlike the judiciary, an administrative agency is not an
independent branch of the government.95  Rather, legislative acts estab-
lish an administrative agency, and Congress delegates, through that act,
the “jurisdiction, function, powers, and resources available to administra-
tive agencies.”96  Administrative agencies specialize in developing and im-
plementing policy in complicated areas of legislation, and with their
expert and specialized knowledge, they solve complex problems arising
from ambiguous congressional legislation.97  In adopting this role, admin-
istrative agencies lighten the burden on the legislature and the judiciary
by clarifying the law.98
The relationship between administrative agencies and the judiciary
continues to change in response to evolving social, political, and economic
concerns.99  While the judiciary generally acts to control and to monitor
unreasonable actions taken by administrative agencies, the judiciary has
not always drawn a consistent line between judicial and administrative au-
94. See Christopher M. Rosselli, Note, Standards for Smart Growth: Searching for
Limits on Agency Discretion and the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority, 36 GA. L.
REV. 247, 257 (2001) (discussing role of administrative agencies in government’s
tripartite system).
95. See Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indi-
rectly Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 694–95 (2006)
(analyzing doctrine of separation of powers).  The separation of powers doctrine
provides a system of checks and balances and seeks to control governmental power
by splitting it between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. See id.
(“[E]ach branch must be confined to the exercise of its own function and not
allowed to encroach upon functions of other branches.”).
96. See E.P. Krauss, Unchecked Powers: The Supreme Court and Administrative Law,
75 MARQ. L. REV. 797, 806 (1992) (placing administrative agencies in tripartite
system of governance and explaining process by which administrative agencies
gain authority).
97. See Rosselli, supra note 94, at 257 (noting that administrative agencies
have both quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers such that “they may take on
administrative, investigative, rulemaking, determinative, enforcement, or oversight
functions”).  “The justifications for the delegation of congressional power to ad-
ministrative agencies include Congress’s inability to handle technical issues and act
efficiently and effectively.  In addition Congress’s limited resources often make it
unable to articulate meaningful standards for particular problems.”  Peter Marra,
Have Administrative Agencies Abandoned Reasonability?, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
763, 767–68 (1996) (footnotes omitted) (addressing manner in which administra-
tive agencies embody role of rational decision-makers).
98. See Marra, supra note 97, at 766 (“[A]dministrative agencies may provide
the mechanism through which Congress can respond to specific issues in a reason-
able manner without having to draft highly technical legislation.”).
99. See ALEXANDER J. CELLA ET AL., 40 MASS. PRAC. ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 1631
(2013) (showing that as administrative law has developed, courts have changed
their methods of controlling agencies in response).
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thority.100  In earlier years, courts “attempted to review the substance of
[administrative] agency decisions by reviewing the agency’s interpretation
of the law and findings of fact.”101  However, due to the technical nature
of many agency decisions, the courts recognized their inability to truly
comprehend the intricacies of agency policy and decided that judicial re-
view of agency procedure was a “more familiar and arguably fairer review
mechanism.”102  The courts now review the responsibilities and functions
delegated to the administrative agency and determine whether they “have
been performed within the confines of the traditional standards of proce-
dural and substantive fair play.”103
B. Supreme Court Precedent: Endorsing Judicial Deference to Administrative
Rulemaking and Expertise
The seminal case by which the courts adopted their present approach
to judicial review of the procedure rather than the substance of agency
decisions is Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.104
In Chevron, the Supreme Court analyzed the District of Columbia (D.C.)
Circuit Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) regulations under the Clean Air Act and ruled that the D.C.
Circuit erred when it substituted its own construction of Clean Air Act
100. See Marra, supra note 97, at 798–800 (explaining that courts act as re-
straints on administrative agencies, yet courts’ role is limited to after agency action
has been taken).
101. See id. (detailing changes in courts’ approach to controlling administra-
tive agency action).
102. See id. (citing Chevron to illustrate decisive change in courts’ approach to
reviewing administrative action).
103. See Joel A. Smith, Separation of Powers Redux-Receded Scope of Judiciary, 44
MD. B.J. 18, 20 (2011) (quoting Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Linchester Sand & Gravel
Corp., 334 A.2d 514, 522–23 (Md. 1975)).  Smith noted that courts serve to pro-
vide forums for redress and restraint of illegal administrative action. See id.; see also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2012) (allowing judicial review
of agency action when it is made reviewable by statute or when agency action is
final and there is no other adequate remedy).
104. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984) (establishing two-step test by which reviewing courts are to evaluate
interpretation of regulatory statute by any agency that administers statutes).
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, the court de-
termines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at is-
sue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. (questioning first whether agency construction of any statute is permissible on
its merits and second whether agency’s interpretive choice resulted from reasoned
decision-making).
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provisions in place of the EPA’s.105  The Supreme Court found that the
judiciary was unable to truly comprehend the lengthy, technical, and
highly complex nature of the Clean Air Act and determined that the D.C.
Circuit “misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at
issue.”106  According to the Supreme Court, federal judges have a duty to
respect the legitimate policy decisions made by administrative agencies be-
cause of the expertise and knowledge underlying those decisions.107
The Court further determined that where Congress fails to clearly de-
fine statutory provisions, the court may not impose its own construc-
tion.108  Rather, Congress’s express delegation of statutory authority to
administrative agencies requires the agencies to formulate policy and to
make rules that resolve uncertainties.109  An administrative agency’s for-
mulation of policy combines the accommodation of competing interests
and a thorough knowledge of highly technical and complex issues.110
Judges are not experts in technical fields nor are they part of either politi-
cal branch of the government.111
Thus, the Supreme Court established that in evaluating administrative
policy, the judiciary should defer to the expertise of the administrative
agency except when the policies are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.112  The scope of review under the arbitrary and
capricious exception used in Chevron is narrow and courts must not at-
tempt to substitute their interpretation of legislative acts for that of an
agency.113  For agency action to avoid being found arbitrary, the agency
must look to all of the information relevant to the creation of the policy
105. See id. at 866 (discussing whether court of appeals should have con-
structed its own meaning of “stationary source” in interpreting certain Clean Air
Act provisions).
106. See id. at 845 (illustrating that once court of appeals recognized congres-
sional gaps in any statute’s meaning, that court should have left interpretation of
those gaps to EPA authority).
107. See id. at 843–44 (establishing that principles of deference to administra-
tive action have been consistently followed by Supreme Court whenever interpreta-
tive decisions requiring more than ordinary knowledge, and regarding meaning or
reach of any legislative act, necessitate reconciliation of conflicting policies and
full understanding of that policy’s effects in any given situation).
108. See id. at 844 (“[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.”).
109. See id. at 843 (discussing administrative agency power to administer pol-
icy and to make rules where there are congressional gaps in legislature).
110. See id. at 865 (explaining why administrative agencies rather than judici-
ary should be interpreting statutes).
111. See id. (claiming that courts in some instances are reconciling competing
political interests but that it is not appropriate to do so on basis of judges’ personal
policy preferences).
112. See id. at 844 (stating standard by which policies must be analyzed under
Administrative Procedure Act).
113. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (reviewing arbitrary and capricious standard of Admin-
istrative Procedure Act).
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and must be able to demonstrate a “rational connection” between the eval-
uated information and the policy implemented.114  Even if the agency is
able to show a rational connection, agency action might still be found arbi-
trary if the agency action relies on information which Congress did not
intend for the agency to use, “entirely failed to consider an important as-
pect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.”115  The arbitrary exception is a very high standard to meet and
even if the administrative agency creates policy with “less than ideal clar-
ity,” the courts may not interfere with that policy if the agency’s goal is
reasonably apparent.116
IV. CASE STUDY: MURNAGHAN V. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Battling with cystic fibrosis, ten-year-old Sarah Murnaghan never led
an easy or normal life.117  For the eighteen months that Sarah waited on
the transplant waitlist, her chance of survival, much less a normal life,
steadily diminished until her parents took action by filing a temporary re-
straining order against HHS.118  The court’s justifications for granting the
temporary restraining order included the nature of Sarah’s injury, the
likelihood of the Murnaghans prevailing on the merits of the case, and the
public interest in the case.119  These justifications reveal the dangers of
ruling on an emotionally appealing individual transplant candidate’s case
without knowledge and expertise of the rationale behind organ allocation
policy.120
114. See id. (setting forth criteria which must be met to avoid arbitrary
exception).
115. See id. (listing various considerations which would cause administrative
agency action to fall within arbitrary exception).
116. See id. (citing Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S.
281, 286 (1974)).
117. See Emergency Motion, supra note 92 (describing Sarah Murnaghan’s
battle with cystic fibrosis).
118. See id. (noting that Sarah was in hospital for 106 consecutive days but on
ninety-second day her condition took drastic turn for worse).
119. For a further discussion of the factors the court considered in deciding
whether to grant the temporary restraining order, see infra notes 135–55 and ac-
companying text.  For a further discussion of the events leading up to Murnaghan,
see infra notes 122–34 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of the impact of changing policy for the sake of an emo-
tionally appealing individual, see infra notes 156–76 and accompanying text.
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A. Sarah’s Battle
Sarah Murnaghan was diagnosed with cystic fibrosis at eighteen
months old, at which time she already had severe lung damage.121  As Sa-
rah grew older, her lung function steadily declined, despite drugs and
multiple forms of therapy.122  Every year Sarah made multiple trips to the
hospital, staying for four to five days at a time.  Yet, Sarah attended school
and her life remained relatively normal.123
In December 2011, Sarah’s condition drastically deteriorated and her
lung capacity diminished to only thirty percent of its normal capacity.124
On December 7, 2011, Sarah was placed on the pediatric lung transplant
waitlist, categorized as a Priority 1 candidate for a set of child-donated
lungs and given an LAS of 40.125  Sarah remained on the pediatric lung
transplant list for eighteen months.126  In May 2013, Sarah was admitted
to the intensive care unit of the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia
(CHOP) after her condition worsened.127
After the doctors told Sarah’s parents that she only had weeks to live,
the Murnaghans began a petition on Change.org in order to mobilize sup-
121. See Declaration of Sharon Ruddock Ex. E at 1, No. 13-CV-03083, 2013
WL 2433840 (E.D. Pa., June 5, 2013) [hereinafter Ruddock Declaration] (present-
ing testimony from Sarah’s aunt regarding Sarah’s past medical history).  Eighteen
months is a late diagnosis for a child with cystic fibrosis. See Marie McCullough,
Phila. Family Fights Lung-Donor Rule for Dying Girl, PHILLY.COM (May 26, 2013),
http://articles.philly.com/2013-05-26/news/39523457_1_cystic-fibrosis-lung-func-
tion-lung-transplant (discussing Sarah’s need for donated lungs).
122. See McCullough, supra note 121 (noting that with available drugs and
therapies, cystic fibrosis patients can remain relatively healthy through their teens
and beyond).
123. See Ruddock Declaration, supra note 121, at 4 (revealing that in addition
to Sarah’s visits to hospitals, she also needed additional medical care at home).
124. See id. at 5 (stating that Sarah has been on supplemental oxygen twenty-
four hours a day since December 2011).
125. See id. at 11 (illustrating gradual increase of Sarah’s condition from when
she was placed on lung transplant waiting list in December 2011 until June 2013).
Unlike adults, an LAS is not used to determine a child’s placement on the waiting
list but rather UNOS gives children an LAS for data purposes. See id. (noting that
Sarah was categorized as Priority 1 for purposes of placing her on child waiting
list).  In December 2011, Sarah’s LAS was at 40 and on June 3, 2013, Sarah’s LAS
was at 66. See id. (showing drastic turn that Sarah’s condition had taken).  If Sarah
was an adult with an LAS of 66, she would be very likely to receive a donated lung.
See Complaint, supra note 10, at 36 (revealing that, according to UNOS data, in
2011, LAS of 50 would put patient in top six percent of organ donor candidates).
126. See Ruddock Declaration, supra note 121, at 5 (emphasizing that Sarah
remained on waitlist because Under 12 Rule kept her from receiving donor organ
offers).
127. See id. at 12 (noting that Sarah had been at CHOP since April 2013).  As
of May 2013, Sarah had not received any offers for a set of adult donated lungs. See
Complaint, supra note 10, at 34 (illustrating difficulty of receiving offer of lungs
pursuant to OPTN’s Under 12 Rule).  She had received three offers of donated
lungs from children, but her doctors advised against taking any of them on the
grounds that they were not medically suitable. See id. (explaining why Sarah had
not been able to accept previous offers of donated lungs).
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port for changing the OPTN’s Under 12 Rule.128  In response to the peti-
tion, the Secretary of the HHS directed the President of the OPTN Board
of Directors to review the lung allocation policy for pediatric candi-
dates.129  Recognizing that the OPTN’s formal review of policy could take
weeks, on June 3, 2013, Sarah’s parents requested that the Secretary set
aside the Under 12 Rule on an emergency basis.130
On June 5, 2013, the Secretary had not responded to the
Murnaghans’ request and the Murnaghans filed a motion in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to compel the HHS to cease enforcement of the Under 12
Rule.131  That same day, the court held a hearing on the motion and
granted the temporary restraining order.132  On June 10, 2013, the OPTN
Board of Directors unanimously passed a resolution to allow children
under the age of twelve to be considered for the adult lung transplant list
128. See Ruddock Declaration, supra note 121, at 21 (stating that on May 16,
2013 Sharon Ruddock and Janet and Francis Murnaghan decided to start media
campaign to fight “inequity”); see also Petition to Kathleen Sebelius: Allow Transplants of
Adult Lungs to Children, CHANGE.ORG (June 2013), http://www.change.org/peti-
tions/allow-transplants-of-adult-lungs-to-children [hereinafter Petition to Kathleen
Sebelius] (presenting petition sent to Kathleen Sebelius and John Roberts, Director
of OPTN, urging them to change OPTN policies and make exceptional rulings
allowing Sarah to get donated lungs).  Change.org is the world’s largest petition
platform. See About, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/about (allowing anyone
to create petition and recruit others to support petition).  Sarah’s petition details
OPTN policies regarding organ allocation to pediatric candidates and discusses
the difficulties that Sarah has faced in receiving a set of donated lungs. See Petition
to Kathleen Sebelius, supra (discussing OPTN’s Under 12 Rule and archiving various
online news articles covering Sarah’s story).
129. See Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., to Dr. John Roberts, Dir., Organ Procurement & Transplantation
Network (May 29, 2013), available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDoc-
uments/OPTN_Exec_Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf (requesting that
OPTN forward information regarding protocol for pediatric lung transplants, in
response to attention from national media, Congress, and others); see also id. (ask-
ing OPTN to consider new approaches for promoting pediatric organ donation).
130. See Complaint, supra note 10, at 45 (submitting request under 42 C.F.R.
§ 121.4(d), which allows any interested party to submit critical comments about
OPTN policy to Secretary and allows Secretary to direct OPTN to change policies).
Through Sarah’s doctors at CHOP, Sarah’s parents twice asked the OPTN Tho-
racic Committee if an appeal could be made to the OPTN Lung Review Board and
the OPTN rejected both requests on the grounds that the OPTN Lung Review
Board had no discretion to set aside the Under 12 Rule. See id. at 39 (discussing
other methods plaintiff had tried prior to petitioning HHS).
131. See id. at 46 (claiming that time sensitive nature of Sarah’s case forced
plaintiff to file suit).
132. See Audio Recording: Temporary Restraining Order Hearing at 59:31,
Murnaghan v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 13-CV-03083, 2013 WL
3363500 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013), available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/pdfs/
Courtroom_3A_6-5-2013_B.mp3 [hereinafter TRO Audio Recording] (ordering
HHS to immediately cease application of Under 12 Rule to allow children under
twelve to be considered as recipients for donated lungs from adults based on medi-
cal severity of their conditions as compared to medical severity of persons over
twelve in OPTN system).
22
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on a case-by-case basis by the OPTN’s Lung Review Board.133  Sarah re-
ceived a set of adult donated lungs on June 12, 2013.134
B. Granting Life
Before granting the temporary restraining order, the court heard ar-
guments from Sarah’s doctor, the Director of the Lung Transplant Pro-
gram at CHOP.135  Sarah’s doctor explained that Sarah was in the end
stages of organ failure and that a lung transplant was the only way that
Sarah would be able to live.136  When the court asked Sarah’s doctor
about OPTN’s Under 12 Rule, which was limiting Sarah’s ability to get a
donated lung, he claimed that age twelve “seemed like an arbitrary num-
ber,” and he did not see a basis for the Under 12 Rule for ten or eleven
year-old children.137
Before making its decision, the court stated that it was relying on the
testimony of Sarah’s doctor that the Under 12 Rule was arbitrary and that
the court was “in no way, shape, or form dictating who gets an organ trans-
133. See OPTN/UNOS Ethics Comm., Policy 3.7.6.4, Lung Candidates with Ex-
ceptional Cases, OPTN: ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 10, 2013), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.
gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf (sup-
plementing previous pediatric lung allocation policy with review mechanisms for
individual cases).  The new policy states that “in the case of candidates aged 0–11
years old, transplant programs may request classification as an adolescent candi-
date for the purposes of Policy 3.7.11 (Sequence of Adult Lung Allocation) while
maintaining their pediatric classification for the purposes of Policy 3.7.11.1 (Se-
quence of Pediatric Donor Lung Allocation).” Id.  While the new policy became
effective immediately, it will expire on July 1, 2014 at which time the OPTN Board
of Directors and committees will reconsider whether it should be renewed. See
OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee Approves Discretionary Listing of Pediatric Lung Trans-
plant Candidates, OPTN: ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 10, 2013), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.
gov/news/newsDetail.asp?id=1598 (publicizing policy changes made by OPTN
Board of Directors following Murnaghan).
134. See Sarah Murnaghan, 11, Home After Controversial Lung Transplant, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 27, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/sarah-murnaghan-11-
home-controversial-lung-transplant/story?id=20080946 (revealing that after Sa-
rah’s first lung transplant on June 12, 2013 failed, she had her second double-lung
transplant surgery on June 15, 2013).
135. See generally TRO Audio Recording, supra note 132 (hearing arguments
on impact that Under 12 Rule has had on Sarah’s circumstance and OPTN’s rea-
soning why courts should not intervene in OPTN policy-making); cf. Liz Szabo,
Ethicists Debate Girl’s Second Lung Transplant, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013), http://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/01/girls-second-lung-transplant/2477
699/ (statement of Dr. David Cornfield) (“When physicians take on the responsi-
bility for an individual patient, they will continue to advocate powerfully and unre-
mittingly for the patient who is before them.”).
136. See TRO Audio Recording, supra note 132, at 6:39–6:53 (explaining that
Sarah needs bilateral lung transplant to survive).
137. See id. at 17:08–18:13 (arguing that age twelve seemed arbitrary cutoff
because cystic fibrosis presents itself in children and adults in similar manner).
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plant.”138  The court also recognized that “this is a serious and sensitive
issue and has caused a great deal of concern by hundreds of people across
the United States.”139  The court then set forth several factors underlying
its grant of the temporary restraining order.140  The following sections will
analyze each of these factors including the nature of Sarah’s legal injury,
the likelihood that the Murnaghans would prevail on the merits of the
case, and the public’s interest in the outcome of the case.141
1. An Irreparable Injury
The court first considered the nature and circumstance of the injury
inflicted on Sarah by the OPTN’s Under 12 Rule.142  The court explained
that the nature and circumstance of Sarah’s condition were very seri-
ous.143  The court determined that under the present Under 12 Rule, Sa-
rah would die.144  The court distinguished the nature of Sarah’s illness
stating that it easily met the threshold requirement for injunctive relief since it
was irreparable.145  Moreover, the court emphasized that it would be a
“terrible tragedy” if it did not grant the temporary restraining order and a
donated set of lungs were to become available for Sarah but she was una-
ble to take them because she was under the age of twelve.146
138. See id. at 43:44–44:40 (stating that decision does not dictate that Sarah
will receive organ).
139. See id. at 43:41–43:51 (recognizing sensitive nature of organ allocation
policy for transplant candidates dealing with life and death decisions).
140. See id. at 53:45–56:33 (discussing factors behind granting TRO).
141. For a further discussion of the irreparable nature of Sarah’s injury, the
likelihood of success on the merits of the claim, and the public interest involved in
this case, see infra notes 142–55 and accompanying text.
142. See TRO Audio Recording, supra note 132, at 53:45–54:01 (hearing testi-
mony from Sarah’s doctor, CHOP’s Director of Lung Transplant Program).
143. See id. at 3:39–6:39 (describing nature of Sarah’s condition).  The testi-
mony of Sarah’s doctor revealed that Sarah had end-stage organ failure and she
required support from a noninvasive ventilator to live on a daily basis. See id. (stat-
ing that Sarah had continually been on ventilators since March).  Sarah’s doctor
stated that the only thing that would allow her to continue to live would be a lung
transplant. See id. at 6:39–6:53 (explaining that Sarah needs bilateral lung trans-
plant to survive).
144. See id. at 20:11–20:39 (discussing Sarah’s chances of survival without lung
transplant).  Sarah’s doctor stated that over the first days of June 2013, Sarah’s
condition had significantly deteriorated. See id. at 20:45–21:13 (answering ques-
tion of urgency of Sarah’s situation).  She had issues with fluid balance and her
heart had shown signs of significant strain. See id. (answering court’s question of
whether doctors had decided to intubate Sarah).  After intubation, statistics show
that patients generally have only weeks to live. See id. at 22:25–23:19 (discussing
process after any patient is intubated).  Sarah’s doctors believed that Sarah would
need to be intubated within the week. See id. 22:07–22:24 (emphasizing that intu-
bation is last resort for patients).
145. See id. at 53:45–54:01 (recognizing that Sarah’s injury is not any kind of
damage that could be compensated other than by injunction).
146. See id. at 57:51–58:28 (acknowledging time sensitivity of Sarah’s case).
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2. Likelihood of Prevailing on the Merits
The court struggled to assess the Murnaghans’ likelihood of prevail-
ing on the merits of the case.147  The court explained that there was no
Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent governing discriminatory pedi-
atric organ allocation policy.148  However, the court stated that it had a
great deal of experience with cases involving discrimination against chil-
dren.149  According to the court, Congress has been especially concerned
with protecting children against discrimination and has enacted several
laws to secure the interests of children.150  Additionally, the court gave
great weight to the testimony of the Director of the Lung Transplant Pro-
gram at CHOP who was an expert in lung allocation policy and stated that
the Under 12 Rule was arbitrary.151
3. Public Interest
Finally, the court considered the impact of granting the temporary
restraining order on the public.152  The Director of the Lung Allocation
Program at CHOP informed the court that only sixteen children across
the United States would be affected by the decision.153  The court recog-
nized that the benefit to those sixteen children would be great and that it
would do little to affect the chances of adult and adolescent candidates to
147. See id. at 54:02–54:20 (relating Sarah’s case to other cases involving dis-
crimination against children because there is no legal precedent dealing with dis-
criminatory organ allocation policy).
148. See id. (emphasizing lack of guidance on this issue).
149. See id. at 54:21–55:19 (relating this case to cases involving educational
policies which discriminate against children because of their disabilities or mental
handicaps).
150. See id. (showing that protection of children’s interests has always been of
special concern to Congress, which implies that children should be protected
against discriminatory organ allocation policy).
151. See id. at 15:53–18:13 (arguing that OPTN’s Under 12 Rule is arbitrary).
The Director of the Lung Allocation Program at CHOP claimed that the justifica-
tion behind the Under 12 Rule was due to the difference in the disease process
between children and adults. See id. (explaining differences between disease pro-
cess in children under the age of five compared to adults were incomparable).
The Director testified that the Under 12 Rule was only helpful in classifying chil-
dren under the age of five from adults and that there was little difference in the
disease process between adults and kids over the age of five. See id. (testifying that
Under 12 Rule was developed nine years ago before medical and scientific ad-
vances made that policy obsolete as applied to children five to eleven years old).
The Director stated he felt that there was no medical justification for the Under 12
Rule and that the age of twelve seemed like an arbitrary number. See id. at
18:32–18:40 (arguing that only justification for rule is that “you don’t disadvantage
one population to another”).
152. See id. at 56:09–56:11 (noting significance of public interest in this case).
153. See id. at 56:52–56:54 (finding that there was one other child under
twelve years old waiting in Eastern District of Pennsylvania for donated lungs who
would be affected by Murnaghan decision).
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receive donated lungs.154  Therefore, the court determined that granting
the temporary restraining order would greatly benefit the plaintiff and
scarcely burden the defendant.155
V. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF MURNAGHAN
The court’s controversial intervention into Sarah’s case highlights sev-
eral problematic issues for dealing with future cases requesting judicial
review of administrative agency policy.156  While the Murnaghan court jus-
tified its intervention into OPTN policy by using the “arbitrary” exception
set forth in Chevron, the technical nature of organ allocation policy makes
judicial intervention inappropriate in light of Chevron’s guiding principle
that courts should defer to administrative agency expertise.157  Especially
where administrative agency expertise is grounded in bioethical principles
designed to benefit all transplant candidates, courts should not interfere
in any individual transplant candidate’s case at the expense of utility, no
matter how tragic that case is.158
A. Directing the OPTN to Cease Enforcement of the Under 12 Rule Fails to
Consider OPTN Expertise
The court made a conscious effort to emphasize the arbitrary nature
of the OPTN’s Under 12 Rule in order to justify departure from Chevron
precedent.159 Chevron allows judicial intervention into an administrative
agency’s policy-making authority only when the legislative regulations are
“arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute.”160  Thus, by
classifying the OPTN’s Under 12 Rule as “arbitrary, capricious and an
154. See id. at 56:12–56:21 (stating that comparing burdens on plaintiff and
defendant is one significant responsibility of courts).
155. See id. at 56:23–56:33 (emphasizing small number of patients affected by
Murnaghan decision).
156. For a discussion of questions raised by the Murnaghan decision regarding
judicial review of administrative agency policies, see infra notes 159–76 and accom-
panying text.
157. For a discussion of Chevron, see supra notes 104–16 and accompanying
text.  For a further discussion of the role Chevron plays in the Murnaghan case, see
infra notes 159–76 and accompanying text.
158. For a further discussion of the bioethical principles used by the OPTN in
creating organ allocation policy, see supra notes 55–90 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion of the bioethical risks implicated by the Murnaghan deci-
sion, see infra notes 177–90 and accompanying text.
159. See TRO Audio Recording, supra note 132, at 47:34–47:53 (discussing
application of Chevron).  The court noted that Sarah’s doctor, the Director of
CHOP’s Lung Allocation Program, felt that OPTN’s Under 12 Rule was arbitrary.
See id. (stating that Sarah’s doctor’s testimony was highly credible).  The court
highlighted that the Director’s language brought the Under 12 Rule under the
purview of Chevron. See id. at 47:53–48:18 (“[A]s we know from the law . . . one of
the damning aspects of a regulation is that it’s arbitrary. . . .  I think that is some-
thing that has a lot of weight.”).
160. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (holding that regulations and policy should control unless they are “arbi-
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abuse of discretion,” the court acted within the language of Chevron when
it directed the OPTN to cease enforcement of the Under 12 Rule.161
However, whether the court’s ruling adhered to the spirit of Chevron is
a more contentious question.162  The answer to this question weighs the
OPTN’s scientifically constructed allocation algorithms designed to dis-
tribute an extremely scarce resource in the most equitable way possible
against the tragic story of a dying ten-year-old girl.163
The OPTN is entrusted with developing and continually improving a
donor system that distributes donated organs as equitably as possible ac-
cording to principles consistent with carefully considered law.164  The do-
nor system shoulders the heavy responsibility of organ allocation and
inherent in that role is the acknowledgement that the donated organ sys-
tem will never be perfect.165  Despite scientific algorithms and vast medi-
cal expertise behind organ allocation policy, the scarcity of organs
prevents the OPTN system from saving every person waiting for a
transplant.166
The court’s directive to the OPTN suggests that any individuals who
are unable to gain their desired results in the face of administrative agency
policy may turn to the court for immediate relief.167  The court’s decision
trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).  For a further discussion of
Chevron, see supra notes 104–16 and accompanying text.
161. See Complaint, supra note 10 (“[APA] authorizes a court to ‘set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions of law found to be . . . arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .’”).
162. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (establishing that judges should provide
“considerable weight” to administrative agency regulation and policy because such
agencies have technical knowledge and expertise about complex issues in specific
field).
163. See OPTN/UNOS Exec. Comm., Lung Allocation Policy Review, OPTN: OR-
GAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. 143 (June 10, 2013), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/
OPTN_Exec_Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf [hereinafter OPTN/UNOS,
Lung Allocation Policy Review] (responding to court’s directive to OPTN Executive
Committee members to cease enforcement of OPTN’s Under 12 Rule).  The
OPTN Executive Committee emphasized that “[i]t is critically important for this
discussion [of reviewing lung allocation policy] to separate the elements of policy
that specifically drive allocation from the elements of policy that afford transplant
centers the opportunity to speak on behalf of an individual patient.” Id. (expres-
sing reluctance to review policy on behalf of individuals).  The OPTN Executive
Committee maintained that “[c]hanges to the former must not be made in re-
sponse to the plea of an individual.” See id. (noting danger of creating policy based
on individual cases is that such process fails to properly balance utility concerns).
164. See id. (reiterating heavy responsibility inherent in OPTN’s role of dis-
tributing organs).
165. See id. (noting that not every candidate’s needs can be met because of
donated organ scarcity).
166. See id. (balancing scarcity of donated organs with large number of candi-
dates needing organ transplants).
167. See Dying Girl Intubated as She Awaits Transplant, FOX NEWS (June 10,
2013), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2013/06/10/parents-file-lawsuit-in-girl-
lung-transplant-case/ (citing Dr. Arthur Caplan, bioethicist at New York University
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threatens the stability of administrative agency authority by exposing it to
individual exceptions.168  Furthermore, the court’s decision presents an
opportunity for future transplant candidates to request judicial interven-
tion when they are unable to receive an organ thereby increasing the
scope and number of individual causes of action.169
In addition to the practical impacts of the Murnaghan decision, the
case implicates many of the underlying justifications of Chevron.170  The
reason why judicial deference to administrative authority is appropriate is
because administrative agencies have extensive experience and knowledge
of highly complex and technical issues.171  Lung allocation policy is highly
scrutinized and evaluated by experienced medical professionals before it is
implemented.172  The integrity of the system is at risk, however, when a
judge has the authority to change the policy on behalf of an individual.173
In Murnaghan, judicial intervention into the sphere of administrative
authority saved the life of a ten-year-old girl and certainly, the preservation
of human life is the OPTN’s highest priority.174  Yet, the OPTN’s subse-
quent examination of pediatric lung allocation policy revealed little evi-
dence that the policy was “arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion”
Langone Medical Center, who believes that Murnaghan opened doors allowing fu-
ture transplant candidates to turn to courts).
168. See OPTN/UNOS, Lung Allocation Policy Review, supra note 163, at 142
(explaining that special OPTN Executive Committee meeting was convened be-
cause one transplant center and one family believe that allocation policies did not
sufficiently provide for circumstances of one individual patient).  The OPTN
noted the dangerous precedent set in the Murnaghan decision of using the federal
court as a mechanism for special review of individual cases. See id. (calling
Murnaghan “an avalanche of events”).
169. See Girl’s Need Breathes Life into Debate over Organ Allocation, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (June 6, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/06/10/
189270798/Girls-Need-Breathes-Life-Into-Debate-Over-Organ-Allocation (present-
ing Dr. Caplan’s concerns over Murnaghan decision’s precedential value).  Dr.
Caplan states, “And then I can start to see other people saying, ‘You know what, I
need a liver.  I need a heart.  Where’s a federal judge?’” Id. (claiming that future
transplant candidates will also seek judicial aid after Murnaghan).
170. For a further discussion of Chevron, see supra notes 104–16 and accompa-
nying text.
171. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1991) (dis-
cussing relationship between judiciary and administrative agencies in creation of
policy).  The Court noted that where there is a complex and highly technical pol-
icy, which necessarily requires significant expertise the court should appropriately
defer to the administrative agency’s interpretation of policy. See id. (following
Chevron precedent).
172. See OPTN/UNOS, Lung Allocation Policy Review, supra note 163, at 24–68
(providing scientific algorithms underlying OPTN lung allocation policy).
173. See id. (“The development of lung allocation policy, as with all OPTN
allocation policy, follows a deliberative approach consistent with the OPTN Final
Rule.  It considers objective medical evidence, current clinical practice and input
from all interested parties.”).
174. See UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2014) (“Success at UNOS means more lives being saved.”).
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as would justify judicial intervention.175  Without findings showing that pe-
diatric lung allocation policy was significantly underperforming or dis-
criminating, the rationale for judicial intervention into OPTN policy fails
to justify the substantial impacts resulting from review of individual
cases.176
B. Judicial Intervention in Individual Cases Violates the Bioethical Principles
Underlying OPTN Policy
Granting the temporary restraining order directing the OPTN to
cease enforcement of the Under 12 Rule is especially controversial when
viewed in light of the bioethical principles underlying OPTN organ alloca-
tion policies.177  Guided by the Final Rule, OPTN organ allocation poli-
175. See Memorandum from Thoracic Organ Transplantation Comm. & Pedi-
atric Transplantation Comm. to OPTN/UNOS Exec. Comm. (June 10, 2013),
available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_
Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf (discussing OPTN findings after reviewing
pediatric lung allocation policy following Murnaghan).  In accordance with
Murnaghan, the Thoracic Organ Transplantation Committee and the Pediatric
Transplantation Committee held an emergency conference to determine if there
was sufficient evidence available to support an immediate modification of the
Under 12 Rule. See id. (describing process OPTN took after Murnaghan).  The
Committees found that “since the implementation of the policy dividing priority
one and priority two pediatric lung candidates . . . the wait list death rate for lung
transplant candidates between six and 11 years old is identical to the death rate for
lung transplant candidates over age 18.” See id. (“[W]aitlist mortality for children
is not significantly higher than it is for adults waiting for lungs.”).  Furthermore,
the Committees found that there was “no significant discrepancy between the
death rates on the waiting list or the transplant rates amongst the pediatric lung
candidates and patients over 18 years of age.” See id. (revealing that there is little
discrepancy between transplant rates of children and adults).  After reviewing the
date, the Committees found that there was no imminent threat to pediatric lung
candidates by the current lung allocation policy and that no emergency action
should be taken to modify the Under 12 Rule. See id. (noting that long-term reas-
sessment of OPTN system following OPTN policy development methods should be
pursued).  In response to the suggestion that the OPTN adopt an interim policy
change allowing special review on individual pediatric cases, the Committees con-
cluded that policy modification compelled by exigent circumstances was not an
appropriate solution and that “potentially unintended consequences to other can-
didate groups awaiting lung transplantation would need to be carefully reviewed”
before making any policy modifications. See id. (emphasizing need for policy to be
made through deliberative processes and not in emergencies).
176. See id. (stating that OPTN Committees are committed to reviewing policy
in deliberate and thorough manner, in order to identify problems, and if neces-
sary, develop solutions based on objective medical evidence and anticipated effects
on all lung transplant candidates).
177. See Sally Satel, How to Fix the Organ Transplant Shortage, AM. ENTERPRISE
INST. (June 20, 2013), http://www.aei.org/article/society-and-culture/how-to-fix-
the-organ-transplant-shortage/ (statement of David Magnus, bioethicist at Stan-
ford University) (“If the distribution of organs becomes subject to the success of
individual publicity campaigns, with organs going to those who hire best PR firms
and lawyers, who on the waiting list would remain confident that their priority
would be decided on the merits?”).  Further, waitlist candidates might feel that
organ allocation is decided on popularity rather than merit. See id.
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cies are based upon the ethical principles of utility, distributive justice, and
autonomy.178  OPTN organ allocation policy combines these ethical prin-
ciples to develop an ideal donor organ system, which simultaneously maxi-
mizes the aggregate amount of medical good, distributes organs in a just
manner, and preserves individual self-determination.179
“The transparent balancing of utility, [distributive] justice combined
with a predictable and stable application of allocation policy is critical to
the fairness of the [donated organ] system.”180  Thus, there is a significant
ethical risk in special review or exceptions to the allocation policy based
on the circumstances and experiences of one particular organ transplant
candidate.181  Reviewing the fairness of allocation policy through the ex-
perience of any individual transplant candidate’s case inevitably subordi-
nates utility to distributive justice concerns.182
The Murnaghan decision highlights several significant ethical con-
cerns including the risk of undermining public trust.183  The OPTN’s or-
gan donation system is effective because it is based on public trust.184  If
individual transplant candidates perceive judicial intervention as a way to
circumvent OPTN policies and gain more favorable access to donated or-
gans, “the result is likely to be significant chaos and inherent unfairness
because access to the courts is not equal.”185  Where the court gives imme-
diate relief to individuals requesting reevaluation of organ allocation pol-
icy, it suggests that candidates ought to use lawsuits to implement more
favorable organ allocation rather than trusting in the expertise of adminis-
trative agencies.186
178. For a further discussion of the Final Rule, see supra note 36 and accom-
panying text.  For a further discussion of utility, see supra notes 62–72 and accom-
panying text.  For a further discussion of distributive justice, see supra notes 73–84
and accompanying text.  For a further discussion of autonomy, see supra notes
85–90 and accompanying text.
179. See OPTN/UNOS, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 62 (“[I]t is unaccept-
able for an allocation policy to strive single-mindedly to maximize aggregate medi-
cal good without any consideration of justice in distribution of the good, or
conversely for a policy to be single-minded about promoting justice at the expense
of the overall medical good.”).
180. OPTN/UNOS Memorandum, supra note 58 (evaluating bioethical risks
which arise out of failing to balance utility and distributive justice).
181. See id. (noting that appeal to unique features of specific individual cases
is not appropriate to make fairness claims against complex algorithms of allocation
policy).
182. See id. (reiterating that effective organ allocation policy is achieved
through balancing utility and distributive justice).
183. See id. (describing dangers of modifying organ allocation policy in hastily
convened committees without open public comment).
184. See id. (noting that public trust in organ allocation policy is determined
through transparent processes that minimize potential for bias or conflict).
185. See id. (stressing importance of donors’ faith in OPTN systems and belief
that it is fair).
186. See id. (implicating principles of Chevron).
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Additionally, in reviewing any individual transplant candidate’s case,
the court becomes susceptible to the “Rule of Rescue.”187  Especially in
cases involving children, it is emotionally appealing to circumvent care-
fully constructed systems of equitable allocation, which may not offer the
best chance at survival, in order to rescue the individual.188  For utility
purposes, allocation policy often requires “dispassionate reasoning and ex-
tensive [medical] experience.”189  When judges intervene in the complex
and highly technical algorithms of organ allocation, they are often well-
intentioned; however, they, “fail to consider all the moral variables that
must be balanced at the macro level rather than through an individual
candidate’s experience.”190
VI. CONCLUSION: CURING THE ILLS OF EXCESSIVE JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
IN ORGAN ALLOCATION POLICY
Judicial intervention in any individual organ transplant candidate’s
case should remain limited under Chevron because judicial intervention
undermines essential bioethical principles of organ allocation policy.191
The fundamental mission of Chevron is to promote judicial deference to
administrative agency expertise and knowledge.192  The need for judicial
deference to administrative agency expertise is especially apparent in or-
gan allocation policy.193  First, organ allocation policy is composed of
highly complex scientific algorithms.194  Without any medical expertise,
judges cannot expect to comprehend all the nuances and implications of
organ allocation policy.195  Second, judicial intervention into any individ-
187. See Satel, supra note 177 (describing how Jonsen’s Rule of Rescue is ap-
plicable in Murnaghan).  The Rule of Rescue, defined by ethicist A.R. Jonsen, evi-
dences the imperative people feel to rescue “identifiable individuals facing
avoidable death.” See id. (“People may expend heroic efforts that either put others
at risk or pose costs to society that could be more efficiently spent to prevent ab-
stract deaths in the larger population.”).
188. See id. (claiming Murnaghan imposed Jonsen’s Rule of Rescue because
media attention surrounding case was eye-catching and effective).
189. See OPTN/UNOS Memorandum, supra note 58 (noting that it is emo-
tionally appealing for politicians or judges to intervene).
190. See id. (describing why it is necessary for OPTN committees to make pol-
icy rather than courts).
191. For a further discussion of why judicial intervention undermines essen-
tial bioethical principles of organ allocation policies, see supra notes 177–90 and
accompanying text.
192. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984) (holding that “responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest
are not judicial ones,” but rather are vested in political branches).
193. For a further discussion of why judicial deference is especially important
in lung allocation policy, see supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
194. See A Guide to Calculating the Lung Allocation Score, supra note 40 (illustrat-
ing complexities of calculating LAS).
195. See David Kemp, Doctors and Lawyers and Such: A Pediatric Lung Transplant
Case Illustrates the Complex Relationship Between the Government and Medical Providers,
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ual transplant candidate’s case upsets the central bioethical principles un-
derlying organ allocation policy and risks the stability of the entire organ
donation system.196  Thus, the problem of excessive judicial intervention
must be remedied in the context of organ allocation policy in order to
achieve the goal of Chevron and to preserve fundamental bioethical princi-
ples.197  There are several approaches available to reduce instances of judi-
cial intervention in organ allocation policy.198
First, Congress and the OPTN must take greater action to increase
the supply of donated organs.199  With greater access to organs, fewer indi-
viduals will have a need to turn to the judiciary for aid in obtaining
donated organs.200  One strategy, which has been proposed to increase
the supply of organs, is to create an organ market and to allow individuals
to broker contracts with other persons interested in selling an organ.201
Another suggested strategy is to enact laws that create presumed con-
JUSTIA (June 17, 2013), http://verdict.justia.com/2013/06/17/doctors-and-law-
yers-and-such (explaining that decision to place organ transplant candidates on
waitlist should be made only by medical experts and professionals with actual
knowledge of individual circumstances).
196. See OPTN/UNOS Memorandum, supra note 58 (explaining that “cir-
cumvention of organ allocation through judicial appeals or other mechanisms is
likely to undermine the main ethical directive of an equitable allocation system”
based on utility and distributive justice).
197. See Transplant Officials Decide Against Emergency Change to Lung Policy, ADVI-
SORY BD. CO. (June 11, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2013/06/
11/Transplant-committee-reconsiders-lung-allocation-policy (arguing that judicial
intervention is not appropriate for managing organ donation because it fails to
consider ethical issues involved in creating rules for all transplant candidates
across country).
198. For a discussion of the solutions to organ scarcity, see infra notes
199–217 and accompanying text.
199. See Arthur L. Caplan, Organ Transplantation: The Challenge of Scarcity, in
THE PENN CENTER GUIDE TO BIOETHICS 679 (2009) (discussing organ transplanta-
tion problems resulting from donated organ scarcity).  Before presenting possible
solutions for expanding the donor pool, Caplan notes that the organ supply prob-
lem most likely will not be fixed at any time in the near future. See id. (stating that
until scientists learn how to grow new organs for transplant, policymakers must
continue to make life and death decisions about who gets organs).  However, be-
cause it is obviously important to try and save more lives, it is necessary for policy-
makers “to consider options that might increase the supply of transplantable
organs without risking the willingness of those now involved to donate.” See id. at
680 (noting legislature’s important role in increasing organ supply).
200. See Satel, supra note 177 (arguing that organ shortage drove Sarah’s par-
ents to plead for Sarah’s life and to bring claims against Sebelius).
201. See Caplan, supra note 199, at 681–82 (presenting ethical challenges to
organ markets).  Dr. Caplan argues that even if the United States adopted an or-
gan market it is unlikely that more people would donate. See id. at 682
(“[D]isincentive to cadaver donation has more to do with aesthetic, emotional, or
religious concerns than lack of payment.”).  Moreover, an organ market most
likely would exploit the poor and encroach on individual free will and autonomy.
See id. (illustrating that poor individual with little choice other than selling organs
to live is free to donate or not donate but has relatively little choice about the
matter).  An additional bioethical concern is that allowing individuals to sell or-
gans violates the core ethical norm of nonmaleficence. See id. (explaining that
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sent.202  In such a system, the presumption is that everyone wants to be an
organ donor upon their death and people who do not want to be organ
donors upon death must register with the state to provide otherwise.203
Additionally, doctors have suggested that persons for whom a determina-
tion of brain death cannot be made could be considered donors in order
to expand the donor pool.204
Second, the OPTN should permanently adopt a special exceptions
policy to allow OPTN committee review of individual pediatric lung candi-
dates.205  If the OPTN provided a mechanism by which individual candi-
dates could seek further review of their particular circumstance,
candidates would perceive the donor system as fairer and would be less
likely to turn to the judiciary to seek aid.206  Moreover, providing individ-
ual candidates with the opportunity to seek a special exception through
OPTN internal processes would keep issues regarding organ allocation
policy within the OPTN’s scope of authority rather than in the hands of
the judiciary.207
Third, judges must restrain from being influenced by emotionally ag-
gressive media campaigns and compelled to make hasty decisions.208  The
removing organs from healthy person violates essential tenet of “do good, avoid
harm” of nonmaleficence).
202. See id. at 682–83 (discussing presumed consent as one option for increas-
ing organ supply and as being practiced in other countries).  The advantage of a
presumed consent system is that people still have the right to choose whether they
want to donate or not since they have the right to opt out of the system. See id.
(showing that in such systems procuring organs is consistent with fundamental
medical ethics).
203. See id. (indicating that based on other countries’ success, United States
could increase donor supply by shifting to presumed consent system).
204. See id. (explaining that lack of consistent national standards for deter-
mining cardiac death could hinder this solution).
205. See Proposed Policy Modification for Executive Committee Consideration, OPTN:
ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. 144–45 (June 10, 2013), available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.
gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf
(presenting proposed policy modification to pediatric lung allocation policy which
expires on July 1, 2014 and which would allow individual pediatric candidates to
request special classification as adults).
206. See Improving Lung Donor Availability and Allocation—Without the Courts,
PENN MEDICINE (June 24, 2013), http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/news/News_Re-
leases/2013/06/halpern/ (statement of Dr. Halpern, medical ethicist at University
of Pennsylvania) (suggesting several methods by which OPTN committees could
make OPTN donated organ systems more efficient, stating, “Not only would these
steps provide more patients with access to life-extending interventions, but by be-
ing more proactive the transplant community can protect the system it has worked
so hard to build from future judicial intervention.”).
207. See generally OPTN/UNOS, Lung Allocation Policy Review, supra note 163
(emphasizing that courts are not proper venues for individuals to plead their case
on organ allocation policy).
208. See Improving Lung Donor Availability and Allocation—Without the Courts,
supra note 206 (questioning medical ethicists from Penn Medicine).  Dr. Halpern,
medical ethicist at the University of Pennsylvania believes that organ allocation
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most effective way to do this is to defer to OPTN authority and if neces-
sary, to make decisions based on extensive and thorough medical expert
testimony.209  When the media highlights the tragic stories of individuals
facing certain death, there is a greater public initiative to save these indi-
viduals immediately and by any means necessary.210  Judges may be influ-
enced by the public’s plea and by the emotionally appealing nature of the
case to grant relief to individual transplant candidates.211  However, if ju-
dicial intervention is necessary, judges should be making fully informed
decisions after extensive and thorough expert testimony.212  By avoiding
hasty decisions, encouraged by emotional media campaigns, judges can
realize their own insufficient knowledge of organ allocation policy and can
choose to defer to the expertise of the OPTN.213
By enacting any of the preceding changes, we can limit judicial inter-
vention into OPTN organ allocation policy and prevent controversial de-
partures from Chevron precedent like that in Murnaghan.214  The tragedy
inherent in organ allocation is never more apparent than in the case of
policies should not favor the most popular or richest transplant candidates who
can run the most successful media campaign, or who have the closest connections
with lawyers and judges. See id. (statement of Dr. Halpern) (“Even if policies are
imperfect, the integrity of the system is completely undermined when judges make
medical decisions, particularly when they do so without considering the medical
facts as happened in the Philadelphia cases.”).
209. See Katie Drummond, Need a Kidney, Please RT: How Social Media Is Chang-
ing Organ Donation, THE VERGE (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/
9/26/4773486/organ-donation-and-social-media-impact (expressing concern that
media threatens to turn organ donation into popularity contests).
210. See Tom Tominson, Lungs for Sarah Murnaghan Raise Ethical Questions,
CTR. FOR ETHICS & HUMANITIES LIFE SCI. MICH. ST. U. (June 27, 2013), http://
msubioethics.com/2013/06/27/lungs-for-sarah-murnaghan-raise-ethical-ques-
tions/ (expressing concerns about having organ distribution systems driven by
sympathy for individual patients who manage to capture public hearts).
211. See Pennsylvania Girl’s Double-Lung Transplant a Success, Family Says, FOX
NEWS (June 13, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2013/06/13/philadel-
phia-girl-double-lung-transplant-success-family-says/ (statement of Dr. Arthur
Caplan, New York University Langone Medical Center) (“[T]he road to a trans-
plant is still to let the system decide who will do best with scarce, lifesaving organs.
And it’s important that people understand that money, visibility, being photo-
genic . . . are factors that have to be kept to a minimum if we’re going to get the
best use out of the scarce supply of donated cadaver organs.”).
212. See Szabo, supra note 135 (statement of Dr. Kevin Donovan, Director of
the Edmund D. Pellegrino Center for Clinical Bioethics at Georgetown University
Medical Center) (“The courts will have the same sympathy that we all would, but
not the same medical information as doctors at the bedside.”).
213. See Transplant Review Board Seek Medical, Legal Balance, USA TODAY (June
11, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/11/transplant-
vote-balance/2413207/ (stating that while members of OPTN committees voiced
sympathy for anyone who is waiting for organs, they argued that making sudden
changes to OPTN organ donation systems to help one group risks harming some
other group).
214. For a further discussion of the changes needed to decrease the effects of
judicial intervention in organ allocation policy, see supra notes 199–213 and ac-
companying text.
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children and the heartbreaking story of a dying ten-year-old girl instinc-
tively inspires the need to protect and rescue.215  However, donated or-
gans are a scarce resource and the court must recognize that, even with
the expertise and knowledge of the OPTN, not all of the tragic stories can
be redeemed.216  Checking judicial intervention into OPTN organ alloca-
tion authority will ultimately preserve an organ allocation system, which
seeks to maximize the benefits of donated organs for all 76,910 active wait-
ing list transplant candidates.217
215. See OPTN/UNOS, Lung Allocation Policy Review, supra note 163 (noting
that candidates will continue to die on waiting lists until organ supply increases
and that OPTN committees should use Sarah’s story to ensure that each person
imploring OPTN committees to make donation systems better also makes that per-
son commit to organ donation).
216. See id. (increasing organ supply would drastically raise number of lives
that could be saved).
217. See OPTN Data, supra note 4 (providing active waiting list data for num-
ber of active waiting list transplant candidates, number of donors, and number of
transplants done).
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